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Proposal of the most severe accidents affecting the  plant safety
PIE Description
FB1 Loss of flow in all FW-BK (first wall blanket) cooling channels of one 
section from total four coolant distribution sections for the outboard or 
inboard segments (48 or 32) because stop of circulators for CCF (common 
cause failure)
FB2 Reduction of flow in all FW-BK cooling channels of one section of the 
outboard or inboard segments because stop of circulator in one SG (steam 
generator) line
FB3 Reduction of flow in cooling channels of one FW-BK module because 
internal clogging
AOP1 Loss of off-site power <1 h
AOP2 Loss of off-site power from 1 h up to 32 h
HB1 Loss of heat sink in all FW-BK primary cooling circuits because trip of both 
HP (high pressure) and LP (low pressure) turbines due to loss of 
condenser vacuum
HB2 Loss of heat sink in one FW-BK cooling train
LBB1 Loss of FW-BK cooling circuit inside breeder blanket box: rupture of a 
sealing weld
LBB2 Loss of FW-BK cooling circuit inside breeder blanket box: leak of a sealing 
weld
LBO1 LOCA Out-VV because large rupture of He manifold feeder inside PHTS 
vault 
LBO2 LOCA Out-VV because small rupture of He manifold feeder inside PHTS 
vault
LBO3 LOCA Out-VV because rupture of tubes in a steam generator (SG)
LBV1 Loss of FW-BK cooling circuit integrity inside VV: Rupture of FW-BK 
module
LBV2 Loss of FW-BK cooling circuit integrity inside VV: Leak from FW-BK 
module
TBO2 Small rupture from PHTS CPS process line inside the PHTS vault (Outside 
VV), i.e. significant amount of tritium released into building
N/S Not Safety Relevant
 Loss of power: AOP2
 LOFA inducing in -vessel LOCA: FB1
 Ex-vessel LOCA inducing in -vessel LOCA: LBO1, LBO3
 Loss of heat sink due to loss of condenser in the S WCS: HB1
 In-box LOCA inducing in -vessel LOCA: LBB1
Safety relevant sources
 Energy
 In operation: enthalpy in structure and coolant, plasma thermal energy, magnetic 
energy
 Decay heat after the plasma shutdown
 Energy from exothermal chemical reactions between materials (e.g. Be-air/steam 
etc.)
 Energy release due to postulated H2 explosion (H2 production due to possible Be-
steam or W-steam reaction by water cooling)
 Tritium
 In the VV (PFC, blanket structure, Li4SiO4, Be, He coolant, He purge gas, armor W 
of divertor, divertor structural and heat sink materials, water coolant, Tokamak dust, 
etc.)
 Out of the VV (PHTSs, TES, tritium plant, hot cells, cryogenic system, etc.)
 Tritium losses into the environment
 Tritium decay
 Activation products
 in structures, Tokamak dust and coolant (corrosion)
 Activated structural materials constituting the in-vessel components are made of W 
alloys, copper alloys and EUROFER
 Dust
 aerosol particulate, broken flakes, globules, chunks, and other debris in the VV
 radio-toxicity due to the high activation of tungsten
 remove from the VV, if its inventory will approach the safety limit
 ACPs
 in the divertor, VV cooling loops and other cooling loops related to auxiliary heating 
or diagnostics equipment using water as coolant
 Neutron sputtering products
 neutron-induced sputtering as mechanism to produce radioactive inventories in the 
heat transfer system 
 Station Blackout (SBO)
A total loss of all alternating current (AC) power as a result of complete failure 
of both off-site and on-site AC power sources ⇒ stop of all circulators, pumps 
and emergency diesel generators. 
 Bounding accident
No active cooling, no active safety system operating, and no intervention for a 
prolonged period are foreseen − the worst consequences of an accident 
driven by in-plant energies.
* The scheme will be updated in the on-going safety program of EUROfusion.
Main safety systems
 VV and its extension (1 st barrier, 1 st confinement)
 VVPSS/EV (2nd barrier, 1 st confinement) 
 Cryostat (decay heat remove)
 FPSS (plasma termination)
 Emergency cooling (2 nd barrier, 1 st confinement) 
 Tokamak and Tritium Building (3 rd barrier, 2 nd confinement)
 HVAC, N-VDS and S-VDS (3rd barrier, 2 nd confinement)
 Common release point (3 rd barrier, 2 nd confinement)
 Nitrogen injection / PAR (Passive Autocatalytic Rec ombiner, avoid H 2 explosion)
 Coil fast discharge system (avoid arc in magnets, a void short in magnets)
 Emergency power supply (supply emergency safety sys tems)
 Fire barriers / suppression (prevent propagation of  fire)
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